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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: UNITED STATES

UNITED KINGDOM

President Eisenhower
Secretary of State Herter
Deputy Secretary Gates
Mr. Marchant
Mr. Irvin
Mr. Bording
Mr. Egarty
General Goodpaster
Major Eisenhower
Mr. White

Prime Minister Macmillan
Foreign Secretary Lloyd
Sir Norman Brook
Ambassador Caccia
Sir Anthony Rumbold
Sir Frederick Moyer Hillar
Mr. Blye
Mr. de Zulueta
Mr. Evans
Mr. Wilding

Subject: Conversation at Chequers, August 29, 1959

Copies to: US Del
General Goodpaster -
Ambassador Whitney.
C-Mr. Marchant
C-Mr. Reinhardt -
EUR-Mr. Kohler-2
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Mr. Macmillan began the conversation by saying that the two Foreign Ministers had had a discussion the previous day about events in the Far East and Middle East, and it would be helpful to have a brief report from them.

West Indies

Mr. Lloyd said that the first subject discussed was that of Trinidad. The United Kingdom understood the importance of the West Indies and of the bases located therein to the United States and is anxious to be helpful. It is largely a question of tactics, i.e., whether to wait or to start dealing with the problem immediately. In the discussion it was agreed that there were three aspects of importance which should be mutually examined: 1) the question of the legal position of United States base rights once the West Indies obtain their independence; 2) those subjects which the present Federation Government would like to submit for possible revision of the base agreements of 1941; 3) a review of the foregoing and a decision as to tactics to be followed in pursuance of that review.

In reply President Eisenhower said that the United States security position in the South Atlantic requires a base; that the United States Government had poured millions into these bases; and now suddenly doesn't want to pull stakes and get out. Secretary Herter pointed out that under Article 28 of the Base Agreements of 1941, either party can request revision. The question was whether these discussions should take place now or later.

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reform in Indonesia had been discussed; that further information was being obtained, but that it looked like wholesale confiscation of currency and bank accounts.

Communiqué

Mr. Lloyd and Secretary Herter confirmed their view that no joint communiqué at the conclusion of the talks would be necessary. President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan confirmed that this was a sensible solution.

President's Discussions in Bonn

With the conclusion of the discussion of the subjects of the previous day, it was suggested that the British participants would be very interested in the President's appraisal of the discussions with Chancellor Adenauer in Bonn. The President replied that his record was not complete because the afternoon session, which he had assured would be with the Chancellor on a private basis for only five minutes, had continued for one and a half hours without the presence of his U.S. interpreter. Mr. Herter added that it might be some time before we had an approved record because the German interpreter would have to clear his notes with the Chancellor who was returning to Italy.

The President said that the Chancellor had regarded the German question as one susceptible only to a long-term solution, requiring lots of patience with the possibility of a gradually growing interchange of persons and communications. The President in reply said that this was fine but what do you do tomorrow? At the moment we are standing on the status quo. The United States was prepared to help but over time our rights in Berlin would become less clear. The Germans therefore should propose a plan. He had suggested to Adenauer that the latter should suggest how West Germany could work out with East Germany a better exchange back and forth of persons. Adenauer had responded that experience had indicated this was dangerous, with East Germans being punished for contacts with West Germany. The President continued that he then suggested a cultural exchange, six persons for six, recognizing that initially West Germany would receive determined Communists but that if this process was maintained over time, it would gradually have an influence among the people in East Germany.

The President said that he had told Adenauer that he was getting tired of standing pat and that Adenauer had agreed to have his experts study the possibilities of a larger interchange of persons.

The President had pointed out to Adenauer that we had been firm in saying "no" to the Soviets but that it was important to know what the West German Government was going to say in the future.

Secretary Herter...

Secretary Herter said that he had talked the same day with Foreign Minister Brentano, indicating that the United States was tired of a negative attitude and inquiring what the Germans proposed. Brentano replied that it was important to have a breather to get over the next national elections. The Secretary had then told Brentano that it was important the latter have a talk with Adenauer about the adoption of a more positive approach. The President suggested that it would be most helpful if we could think up a program to suggest to Adenauer because if the Germans themselves didn't move, this thing could become progressively more difficult.

The President said that Adenauer had stressed that the thing he was interested in was the humanitarian aspects of the twenty million people in the East Zone.

The President questioned whether the United States could be expected to keep troops in Europe forever. Adenauer's attitude was that if you're going to establish a neutral zone, don't make it Germany. When the President raised the question of a corridor to West Berlin, Adenauer said that the other side would never agree.

Prime Minister Macmillan said that this discussion leads on to the question of getting a moratorium; that it had looked to him at one time as if the Soviets would accept this but that the question had then arisen about the status of Berlin at the end of the period. There seemed to have been a change in the Soviet position on our rights after the moratorium.

The President pointed out that our policy had been that changes in the Berlin situation could only be made by mutual consent and that we should not go back on this. Secretary Herter added that an interim arrangement involves the danger that we have undermined or given up our position. The Prime Minister said that his interpretation was that at the end of a moratorium our position on rights would be the same as it had been at the beginning; but he recognized that in a sense the mere passage of time would make some change in the situation and that it might have been for this intellectual or theoretical reason that the Russians had declined to commit themselves as to the position at the end of the agreement. The President said that we have a genius for getting in a hole but to protect ourselves we are always having to defend Moscow or some other out of the way place.

Foreign Minister Lloyd added, certainly, we have to be firm on essentials. The President pointed out that in his last

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message from Khrushchev, the letter had said that "we must clear up the residue of war". He, the President, wanted to point out that the division of Germany was one of the residues of war, which should be cleared up.

Prime Minister Macmillan then inquired as to what the United States thought would happen in the next stage of the Berlin problem. Secretary Herter replied that we don't want rights in perpetuity in Berlin, but want them admitted until such time as the situation could be changed by mutual agreement. The Secretary pointed out that Gromyko in the discussions in Geneva had given away his hand regarding the Soviet expectation of an East German takeover of Berlin after any moratorium.

Prime Minister Macmillan then inquired as to our appraisal of the coming visit with Khrushchev. The President replied that he would expect with the visit, and with Khrushchev's family accompanying him, there was the potential to make an impression on the Soviet leader. The President, therefore, was anxious that they be received well. When the Prime Minister inquired whether there was something in this visit which he would interpret as leading to a Summit, the President replied that without progress, he, the President, would not go to a Summit. After a brief general discussion as to what would constitute "progress," the President said that if Khrushchev suggested the U.S. and USSR agree between themselves on some form of progress, the President would decline to make such an agreement but would hope that when Khrushchev returned to his own country and thought it over, he might issue a public statement which would make a Summit possible. In this manner the allies could react as they had a right to do. Macmillan inquired as to what Adenauer had to say about a Summit. The President replied that Adenauer had concurred in his belief that progress was necessary before a Summit meeting should be held. The President expressed the belief that Khrushchev would avoid embarrassing either the President or the United States while in the latter country and made the observation that "if we stall long enough, maybe this will constitute a moratorium".

Talks with de Gaulle

When Mr. Macmillan referred to the President's impending visit to Paris, the President summarized his discussion with Adenauer - on the Algerian situation. The Chancellor had said that de Gaulle was in an impossible situation because, if he announced a policy sufficiently liberal to satisfy the Algerians, he would lose the support of the colons and the French Army. Adenauer had urged the President to support the French on Algeria which would greatly strengthen de Gaulle's hand. If de Gaulle failed there would be revolution in France. The President pointed out that Adenauer had suggested unqualified support but that U.S. policy which had been set forth in public statements by Messrs. Dillan and Allen, was that we would support any reasonable solution. The President did not believe that a solution could be found merely by the use of force. Furthermore there was a strong tradition in the United States against colonialism and no United States Government would support the French in a policy which held out no

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